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Abstract
The undercut procedure was presented by Brams et al. [3] as a procedure for
identifying an envy-free allocation when agents have preferences over sets of
objects. They assumed that agents have strict preferences over objects and
their preferences are extended over to sets of objects via the responsive set
extension. We point out some shortcomings of the undercut procedure. We
then simplify the undercut procedure of Brams et al. [3] and show that it works
under a more general condition where agents may express indifference between
objects and they may not necessarily have responsive preferences over sets of
objects. Finally, we show that the procedure works even if agents have unequal
claims.
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1. Introduction
Allocation of indivisible resources is one of the most fundamental problems
in fair division and multiagent resource allocation [2]. Many of the fair division
settings feature two agents since disputes often concern two parties. Recently
Brams et al. [3] presented the undercut procedure which is an elegant procedure
to divide a set of contested indivisible objects fairly among two agents. A
crucial assumption in the paper was that agents have a strict ranking over the
objects and the preferences over sets of objects are responsive. Preferences over
sets of objects are responsive if for any set in which an object is replaced by
a more preferred object, the new set is more preferred. We first show that
the assumption of responsive preferences can be somewhat restrictive. We also
identify three shortcomings of the first few steps of the undercut procedure.
Finally we rectify the shortcomings by simplifying the undercut procedure of
Brams et al. [3] and showing that it returns an envy-free allocation (if it exists)
under a more general preference restriction called separability.
The setting we consider concerns two agents 1 and 2 and a set of objects
O. Both agents have complete and transitive preferences %1 and %2 over the
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subsets of objects in O. The goal is to identify an envy-free split (S,−S) where
S is the allocation of agent 1 and −S = O \ S is the allocation of agent 2.
2. The undercut procedure
The undercut procedure is a discrete generalization of the divide and choose
cake cutting protocol [Chapter 1, 2]. The elegance of the undercut procedure
lies in the fact that although agents have preferences over sets of objects, it is
sufficient to only consider or query about the minimal bundles of the agents. A
subset S ⊆ O is a minimal bundle for agent i if S %i −S and for any T ⊂ S,
−T ≻i T . The set of minimal bundles of agent i is denoted by MBi. Any
envy-free split (S,−S) of O is trivial if S ∼1 −S and −S ∼2 S. The main idea
underlying the undercut procedure is that there exists a non-trivial envy-free
allocation if the set of minimal bundles of both agents is not the same. The
undercut procedure goes through the minimal bundles of the agents to identify
an envy-free allocation if it exists [3]. We refer the reader to Algorithm 1 for an
adapted specification of the undercut procedure.
Algorithm 1 Undercut procedure of Brams et al. [3]
Input: (N,O,%)
Output: Envy-free split if it is exists.
1 Generation Phase: Agent 1 and 2’s most preferred objects are given to them if
they do not coincide. If the object coincides, then it is placed in the contested pile
IC ⊂ O. The process continues until all objects have been names by at least one
agent. If the contested pile is empty, the procedure ends. Otherwise, each agent i
identifies his set of minimal bundles MBi of IC .
2 If MB1 6= MB2, each agent i provides reports to the mechanism a ranking of
his minimal bundles. An agent i is chosen at random, and one of i’s top-ranked
minimal bundle S is considered. If S /∈MB−i , then it becomes the proposal, and
i is the proposer. If S ∈MB−i, then one of −i’s top-ranked minimal bundle S
′ is
considered. If S′ /∈ MBi, then it becomes the proposal, and −i the proposer. If
S′ ∈MBi, then the process continues until a minimal bundle of one agent is found
that is not a minimal bundle of the other. Then proceed to step 4.
3 If MB1 = MB2, and there exists an S such that S ∈ MBi and S ∈ MBi (and,
therefore S,−S ∈MB−i also), then S becomes the proposal. If there is no minimal
bundle S such that S is also a minimal bundle, then a minimal bundle is chosen
randomly and becomes the proposal.
4 Assume that S is the proposal and the proposer is i. Then −i may respond by i)
accepting −S of IC or ii) undercutting i’s proposal, i.e., taking his most-preferred
subset T and giving −T to −i. The procedure ends. An agent’s subset of O consists
of all objects received in steps 1 and 2, plus the agent’s share of the contested pile
determined in step 4.
Limitation of responsive preferences. The undercut procedure was shown to
find an envy-free allocation if the preferences of agents are responsive. Respon-
siveness is a well-established preference restriction on preferences over sets of
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objects which assumes that the agents have preferences over the individual ob-
jects. Preferences over sets of objects are responsive, if for any two sets that
differ only in one object, the agent prefers the set containing the more preferred
object [1]. We first highlight that responsive preferences can be restrictive.
Example 1. In a divorce dispute, husband h may prefer each of the two family
dogs d1 and d2 over the car c: {d1} ≻h {d2} ≻h {c} ≻h ∅. If the husband’s pref-
erences are responsive, then his preferences over the set of issues is as follows:
{d1, d2, c} ≻h {d1, d2} ≻h {d1, c} ≻h {d2, c}.
However it may be the case that the husband prefers the set of a car and a
dog to the set of two dogs: {d1, c} ≻h {d1, d2}. This way he will have both a
companion and a ride. {d1, d2, c} ≻h {d1, c} ≻h {d2, c} ≻h {d1, d2}.
A preference relation ≻ is separable if for all S ⊂ O such that x /∈ S, the
following holds: {x} ≻ ∅ if and only if S ∪ {x} ≻ S [1]. Informally, separability
means that if an agent prefers having the object than having nothing, he would
also prefer the inclusion of the object in any other set that does not include the
object. Whereas responsive preferences are separable, separable preferences are
more general than responsive preferences. Just as in [3], we will assume that
all the objects are desirable. However, we will not use the restriction in [3] that
preferences over objects do not admit ties.
Issues with the generation phase of the undercut procedure. In the generation
phase of the undercut procedure (Algorithm 1), each agent sequentially picks
up his maximal object if it is uncontested. Otherwise each contested object goes
into the “contested pile”. We argue that the generation phase of the undercut
procedure (also referred to as the generation phase in [5]) has some drawbacks.
Firstly, undercut may fail to identify an envy-free split because of the generation
phase. Let us consider the following preferences of agents 1 and 2: a ≻1 b ≻1
c ≻1 d and b ≻2 c ≻2 d ≻2 a. If {a, d} ∼1 {b, c}, we know that the assignment
which allocated {a, d} to agent 1 and {b, c} to agent 2 is envy-free. However
undercut fails to compute this assignment. The reason is that in the generation
phase, agent 1 takes a and agent 2 takes b. After this the contested pile is {c, d}.
The undercut procedure ends up in a deadlock in this contested pile. Secondly,
even if the undercut procedure works for certain responsive preferences, the
generation phase hinders it from working for separable preferences. Thirdly, the
generation phase use sequential allocation. It is well-understood that sequential
allocation is highly susceptible to manipulation if at least one agent has sufficient
information about the other agent’s preferences [4, 5]. One point which goes in
favour of Step 1 and 2 of the undercut procedure is that it decreases the size of
the contested pile which was presumably the motivation behind the steps.
Simplified undercut procedure. Next, we show that the simplified undercut pro-
cedure works for transitive and separable preferences. We define a simplified
undercut procedure as follows. Simplified Undercut: Treat the set of all ob-
jects as the contested pile and run the original undercut procedure while ignoring
the generation phase of the original undercut procedure.
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Proposition 1. For transitive and separable preferences, there is a non-trivial
envy-free split if and only if the set of minimal bundles of both agents is not the
same. Furthermore the simplified undercut procedure finds such an a split.
Proof. The argument is similar to the one for the proof of [Theorem 1, 3]. We
first prove that if a non-trivial envy-free split exists it implies that the set of
minimal bundles of both agents is not the same. Let us assume that a non-trivial
envy-free split (S,−S) exists. Then there must be an agent i ∈ {1, 2} such that
S ≻i −S. By the definition of minimal bundle, we know that −S /∈ MBi.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that S ∈MBi. If it were not then we
argue that there exists an S′ such that S′ ∈MBi, S′ ⊂ S, such that S′ %i −S′.
For an S′ ⊂ S, by separability, we know that S ≻i S′. Similarly, by separability,
we know that −S′ ≻i −S because −S′ can be obtained from −S by adding those
elements to −S as the elements that are removed from S to obtain S′. Since %i
is transitive and complete, there exists some S′ such that S′ %i −S
′ for which
there exists no subset S′′ ⊂ S′ such that S′′ %i −S′′.
Now if S′ ∼ −S′, then we know that S′ ∈ MBi. By separability, we also
know that −S′ ≻−i −S %−i S ≻−i S′. Hence S′ /∈ MB−i which means that
set of minimal bundles of both agents is not the same. If S /∈ MB−i, then
we have already proved that the set of minimal bundles of the two agents are
different. Now let us assume that S ∈ MB−i. Then we know that S %−i −S.
Since (S,−S) is envy-free, then it follows that −S %−i S. Hence S ∼−i −S. If
−S ∈ MB−i then we are already done. We show that −S is indeed in MB−i.
Consider any T ⊂ −S which implies by separability that −S ≻−i T . Since
S = O \ −S and since T ⊂ −S, we know that O \ T = −T ⊃ S. This implies
by separability that −T ≻−i S. Since −T ≻−i S, −S ≻−i T and S ∼−i −S, we
get by transitivity that −T ≻−i T . Hence we have shown that −S ∈ MB−i.
Since we know that −S /∈ MBi, the set of minimal bundles of both agents is
not the same.
We now prove that if the two agents do not have the same set of minimal
bundles then there exists a non-trivial envy-free split. Let us assume that the
two agents do not have the same set of minimal bundles i.e., there exists an
S ⊂ O such that S ∈ MBi and S /∈ MB−i. If −S %−i S, then (S,−S) is
an envy-free split. When agent i will propose (S,−S), agent −i will accept
it. Therefore let us look at the other case when S ≻−i −S. If S ≻−i −S, and
S /∈ MB−i, then by the definition of a minimal bundle we know that there
exists a T ⊂ S such that T %−i −T . Agent −i will undercut the proposal
(S,−S) of agent i and will be ready to take T . For agent 1, we know that
S ≻i −T ≻i T ≻i −S. Thus (−T, T ) is an envy-free split.
The argument is similar to the one for the proof of [Theorem 1, 3]. If
a trivial envy-free split exists, the simplified undercut procedure will find it
since it considers the minimal bundles of the two agents. If a trivial envy-
free split does not exist but a non-trivial one does, even then the simplified
undercut procedure will find it. If agents have unequal claims say claim ci for
agent i, then the definition of envy-freeness can be easily extended as follows:
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ui(S) ≥
ci
c
−i
ui(−S) for an allocation where i gets S. If agents have unequal
claims, the undercut procedure still works as follows. We simply redefine a
minimal bundle S for agent i as a set of objects such that ui(S) ≥
ci
c
−i
ui(−S)
and for any T ⊂ S, ui(T ) <
ci
c
−i
ui(−T ).
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